/* eslint-disable @typescript-eslint/indent */

import type {
  TrustedHTML,
  TrustedTypesWindow,
} from 'trusted-types/lib/index.js';
import type { Config, UseProfilesConfig } from './config';
import * as TAGS from './tags.js';
import * as ATTRS from './attrs.js';
import * as EXPRESSIONS from './regexp.js';
import {
  addToSet,
  clone,
  entries,
  freeze,
  arrayForEach,
  arrayIsArray,
  arrayLastIndexOf,
  arrayPop,
  arrayPush,
  arraySplice,
  stringMatch,
  stringReplace,
  stringToLowerCase,
  stringToString,
  stringIndexOf,
  stringTrim,
  regExpTest,
  isRegex,
  typeErrorCreate,
  lookupGetter,
  create,
  objectHasOwnProperty,
  stringifyValue,
} from './utils.js';

export type { Config } from './config';

declare const VERSION: string;

// https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Node/nodeType
const NODE_TYPE = {
  element: 1,
  attribute: 2,
  text: 3,
  cdataSection: 4,
  entityReference: 5, // Deprecated
  entityNode: 6, // Deprecated
  progressingInstruction: 7,
  comment: 8,
  document: 9,
  documentType: 10,
  documentFragment: 11,
  notation: 12, // Deprecated
};

const getGlobal = function (): WindowLike {
  return typeof window === 'undefined' ? null : window;
};

/**
 * Creates a no-op policy for internal use only.
 * Don't export this function outside this module!
 * @param trustedTypes The policy factory.
 * @param purifyHostElement The Script element used to load DOMPurify (to determine policy name suffix).
 * @return The policy created (or null, if Trusted Types
 * are not supported or creating the policy failed).
 */
const _createTrustedTypesPolicy = function (
  trustedTypes: TrustedTypePolicyFactory,
  purifyHostElement: HTMLScriptElement
) {
  if (
    typeof trustedTypes !== 'object' ||
    typeof trustedTypes.createPolicy !== 'function'
  ) {
    return null;
  }

  // Allow the callers to control the unique policy name
  // by adding a data-tt-policy-suffix to the script element with the DOMPurify.
  // Policy creation with duplicate names throws in Trusted Types.
  let suffix = null;
  const ATTR_NAME = 'data-tt-policy-suffix';
  if (purifyHostElement && purifyHostElement.hasAttribute(ATTR_NAME)) {
    suffix = purifyHostElement.getAttribute(ATTR_NAME);
  }

  const policyName = 'dompurify' + (suffix ? '#' + suffix : '');

  try {
    return trustedTypes.createPolicy(policyName, {
      createHTML(html) {
        return html;
      },
      createScriptURL(scriptUrl) {
        return scriptUrl;
      },
    });
  } catch (_) {
    // Policy creation failed (most likely another DOMPurify script has
    // already run). Skip creating the policy, as this will only cause errors
    // if TT are enforced.
    console.warn(
      'TrustedTypes policy ' + policyName + ' could not be created.'
    );
    return null;
  }
};

const _createHooksMap = function (): HooksMap {
  return {
    afterSanitizeAttributes: [],
    afterSanitizeElements: [],
    afterSanitizeShadowDOM: [],
    beforeSanitizeAttributes: [],
    beforeSanitizeElements: [],
    beforeSanitizeShadowDOM: [],
    uponSanitizeAttribute: [],
    uponSanitizeElement: [],
    uponSanitizeShadowNode: [],
  };
};

function createDOMPurify(window: WindowLike = getGlobal()): DOMPurify {
  const DOMPurify: DOMPurify = (root: WindowLike) => createDOMPurify(root);

  DOMPurify.version = VERSION;

  DOMPurify.removed = [];

  if (
    !window ||
    !window.document ||
    window.document.nodeType !== NODE_TYPE.document ||
    !window.Element
  ) {
    // Not running in a browser, provide a factory function
    // so that you can pass your own Window
    DOMPurify.isSupported = false;

    return DOMPurify;
  }

  let { document } = window;

  const originalDocument = document;
  const currentScript: HTMLScriptElement =
    originalDocument.currentScript as HTMLScriptElement;
  const {
    DocumentFragment,
    HTMLTemplateElement,
    Node,
    Element,
    NodeFilter,
    NamedNodeMap = window.NamedNodeMap || (window as any).MozNamedAttrMap,
    HTMLFormElement,
    DOMParser,
    trustedTypes,
  } = window;

  const ElementPrototype = Element.prototype;

  const cloneNode = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'cloneNode');
  const remove = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'remove');
  const getNextSibling = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'nextSibling');
  const getChildNodes = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'childNodes');
  const getParentNode = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'parentNode');
  const getShadowRoot = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'shadowRoot');
  const getAttributes = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'attributes');
  const getNodeType =
    Node && Node.prototype ? lookupGetter(Node.prototype, 'nodeType') : null;
  const getNodeName =
    Node && Node.prototype ? lookupGetter(Node.prototype, 'nodeName') : null;

  // As per issue #47, the web-components registry is inherited by a
  // new document created via createHTMLDocument. As per the spec
  // (http://w3c.github.io/webcomponents/spec/custom/#creating-and-passing-registries)
  // a new empty registry is used when creating a template contents owner
  // document, so we use that as our parent document to ensure nothing
  // is inherited.
  if (typeof HTMLTemplateElement === 'function') {
    const template = document.createElement('template');
    if (template.content && template.content.ownerDocument) {
      document = template.content.ownerDocument;
    }
  }

  let trustedTypesPolicy;
  let emptyHTML = '';

  // The instance's own internal Trusted Types policy. Unlike a caller-supplied
  // `TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY`, this is created at most once — Trusted Types throws
  // on duplicate policy names — and is the only policy allowed to persist
  // across configurations and survive `clearConfig()`.
  let defaultTrustedTypesPolicy;
  let defaultTrustedTypesPolicyResolved = false;

  // Tracks whether we are already inside a call to the configured Trusted Types
  // policy (`createHTML` or `createScriptURL`). If a supplied policy callback
  // itself calls `DOMPurify.sanitize` (the cause of #1422), `sanitize` would
  // re-enter the policy and recurse until the stack overflows. We detect that
  // re-entry and throw a clear, actionable error instead. The guard is shared
  // across both callbacks, because either one re-entering `sanitize` triggers
  // the same unbounded recursion.
  let IN_TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY = 0;
  const _assertNotInTrustedTypesPolicy = function (): void {
    if (IN_TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY > 0) {
      throw typeErrorCreate(
        'A configured TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY callback (createHTML or ' +
          'createScriptURL) must not call DOMPurify.sanitize, as that causes ' +
          'infinite recursion. Do not pass a policy whose callbacks wrap ' +
          'DOMPurify as TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY; see the "DOMPurify and Trusted ' +
          'Types" section of the README.'
      );
    }
  };

  const _createTrustedHTML = function (html: string): string {
    _assertNotInTrustedTypesPolicy();

    IN_TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY++;
    try {
      return trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML(html);
    } finally {
      IN_TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY--;
    }
  };

  const _createTrustedScriptURL = function (scriptUrl: string): string {
    _assertNotInTrustedTypesPolicy();

    IN_TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY++;
    try {
      return trustedTypesPolicy.createScriptURL(scriptUrl);
    } finally {
      IN_TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY--;
    }
  };

  // Lazily resolve (and cache) the instance's internal default policy.
  // Resolution is attempted at most once: a successful `createPolicy` cannot be
  // repeated (Trusted Types throws on duplicate names), and a failed or
  // unsupported attempt must not be retried on every parse.
  const _getDefaultTrustedTypesPolicy = function () {
    if (!defaultTrustedTypesPolicyResolved) {
      defaultTrustedTypesPolicy = _createTrustedTypesPolicy(
        trustedTypes,
        currentScript
      );
      defaultTrustedTypesPolicyResolved = true;
    }

    return defaultTrustedTypesPolicy;
  };

  const {
    implementation,
    createNodeIterator,
    createDocumentFragment,
    getElementsByTagName,
  } = document;
  const { importNode } = originalDocument;

  let hooks = _createHooksMap();

  /**
   * Expose whether this browser supports running the full DOMPurify.
   */
  DOMPurify.isSupported =
    typeof entries === 'function' &&
    typeof getParentNode === 'function' &&
    implementation &&
    implementation.createHTMLDocument !== undefined;

  const {
    MUSTACHE_EXPR,
    ERB_EXPR,
    TMPLIT_EXPR,
    DATA_ATTR,
    ARIA_ATTR,
    IS_SCRIPT_OR_DATA,
    ATTR_WHITESPACE,
    CUSTOM_ELEMENT,
  } = EXPRESSIONS;

  let { IS_ALLOWED_URI } = EXPRESSIONS;

  /**
   * We consider the elements and attributes below to be safe. Ideally
   * don't add any new ones but feel free to remove unwanted ones.
   */

  /* allowed element names */
  let ALLOWED_TAGS = null;
  const DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS = addToSet({}, [
    ...TAGS.html,
    ...TAGS.svg,
    ...TAGS.svgFilters,
    ...TAGS.mathMl,
    ...TAGS.text,
  ]);

  /* Allowed attribute names */
  let ALLOWED_ATTR = null;
  const DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR = addToSet({}, [
    ...ATTRS.html,
    ...ATTRS.svg,
    ...ATTRS.mathMl,
    ...ATTRS.xml,
  ]);

  /*
   * Configure how DOMPurify should handle custom elements and their attributes as well as customized built-in elements.
   * @property {RegExp|Function|null} tagNameCheck one of [null, regexPattern, predicate]. Default: `null` (disallow any custom elements)
   * @property {RegExp|Function|null} attributeNameCheck one of [null, regexPattern, predicate]. Default: `null` (disallow any attributes not on the allow list)
   * @property {boolean} allowCustomizedBuiltInElements allow custom elements derived from built-ins if they pass CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck. Default: `false`.
   */
  let CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING = Object.seal(
    create(null, {
      tagNameCheck: {
        writable: true,
        configurable: false,
        enumerable: true,
        value: null,
      },
      attributeNameCheck: {
        writable: true,
        configurable: false,
        enumerable: true,
        value: null,
      },
      allowCustomizedBuiltInElements: {
        writable: true,
        configurable: false,
        enumerable: true,
        value: false,
      },
    })
  );

  /* Explicitly forbidden tags (overrides ALLOWED_TAGS/ADD_TAGS) */
  let FORBID_TAGS = null;

  /* Explicitly forbidden attributes (overrides ALLOWED_ATTR/ADD_ATTR) */
  let FORBID_ATTR = null;

  /* Config object to store ADD_TAGS/ADD_ATTR functions (when used as functions) */
  const EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING = Object.seal(
    create(null, {
      tagCheck: {
        writable: true,
        configurable: false,
        enumerable: true,
        value: null,
      },
      attributeCheck: {
        writable: true,
        configurable: false,
        enumerable: true,
        value: null,
      },
    })
  );

  /* Decide if ARIA attributes are okay */
  let ALLOW_ARIA_ATTR = true;

  /* Decide if custom data attributes are okay */
  let ALLOW_DATA_ATTR = true;

  /* Decide if unknown protocols are okay */
  let ALLOW_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOLS = false;

  /* Decide if self-closing tags in attributes are allowed.
   * Usually removed due to a mXSS issue in jQuery 3.0 */
  let ALLOW_SELF_CLOSE_IN_ATTR = true;

  /* Output should be safe for common template engines.
   * This means, DOMPurify removes data attributes, mustaches and ERB
   */
  let SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES = false;

  /* Output should be safe even for XML used within HTML and alike.
   * This means, DOMPurify removes comments when containing risky content.
   */
  let SAFE_FOR_XML = true;

  /* Decide if document with <html>... should be returned */
  let WHOLE_DOCUMENT = false;

  /* Track whether config is already set on this instance of DOMPurify. */
  let SET_CONFIG = false;

  /* Decide if all elements (e.g. style, script) must be children of
   * document.body. By default, browsers might move them to document.head */
  let FORCE_BODY = false;

  /* Decide if a DOM `HTMLBodyElement` should be returned, instead of a html
   * string (or a TrustedHTML object if Trusted Types are supported).
   * If `WHOLE_DOCUMENT` is enabled a `HTMLHtmlElement` will be returned instead
   */
  let RETURN_DOM = false;

  /* Decide if a DOM `DocumentFragment` should be returned, instead of a html
   * string  (or a TrustedHTML object if Trusted Types are supported) */
  let RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT = false;

  /* Try to return a Trusted Type object instead of a string, return a string in
   * case Trusted Types are not supported  */
  let RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE = false;

  /* Output should be free from DOM clobbering attacks?
   * This sanitizes markups named with colliding, clobberable built-in DOM APIs.
   */
  let SANITIZE_DOM = true;

  /* Achieve full DOM Clobbering protection by isolating the namespace of named
   * properties and JS variables, mitigating attacks that abuse the HTML/DOM spec rules.
   *
   * HTML/DOM spec rules that enable DOM Clobbering:
   *   - Named Access on Window (§7.3.3)
   *   - DOM Tree Accessors (§3.1.5)
   *   - Form Element Parent-Child Relations (§4.10.3)
   *   - Iframe srcdoc / Nested WindowProxies (§4.8.5)
   *   - HTMLCollection (§4.2.10.2)
   *
   * Namespace isolation is implemented by prefixing `id` and `name` attributes
   * with a constant string, i.e., `user-content-`
   */
  let SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS = false;
  const SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS_PREFIX = 'user-content-';

  /* Keep element content when removing element? */
  let KEEP_CONTENT = true;

  /* If a `Node` is passed to sanitize(), then performs sanitization in-place instead
   * of importing it into a new Document and returning a sanitized copy */
  let IN_PLACE = false;

  /* Allow usage of profiles like html, svg and mathMl */
  let USE_PROFILES: UseProfilesConfig | false = {};

  /* Tags to ignore content of when KEEP_CONTENT is true */
  let FORBID_CONTENTS = null;
  const DEFAULT_FORBID_CONTENTS = addToSet({}, [
    'annotation-xml',
    'audio',
    'colgroup',
    'desc',
    'foreignobject',
    'head',
    'iframe',
    'math',
    'mi',
    'mn',
    'mo',
    'ms',
    'mtext',
    'noembed',
    'noframes',
    'noscript',
    'plaintext',
    'script',
    // <selectedcontent> mirrors the selected <option>'s subtree, cloned by
    // the UA (customizable <select>) — including any on* handlers — and the
    // engine re-mirrors synchronously whenever a removal changes which
    // option/selectedcontent is current, even inside DOMPurify's inert
    // DOMParser document. Hoisting its children on removal re-inserts a fresh
    // mirror target ahead of the walk, which the engine refills, looping
    // forever (DoS) and amplifying output. Dropping its content on removal
    // (rather than hoisting) breaks that cascade; the content is a duplicate
    // of the option, which is sanitized on its own. See campaign-3 F1/F6.
    'selectedcontent',
    'style',
    'svg',
    'template',
    'thead',
    'title',
    'video',
    'xmp',
  ]);

  /* Tags that are safe for data: URIs */
  let DATA_URI_TAGS = null;
  const DEFAULT_DATA_URI_TAGS = addToSet({}, [
    'audio',
    'video',
    'img',
    'source',
    'image',
    'track',
  ]);

  /* Attributes safe for values like "javascript:" */
  let URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES = null;
  const DEFAULT_URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES = addToSet({}, [
    'alt',
    'class',
    'for',
    'id',
    'label',
    'name',
    'pattern',
    'placeholder',
    'role',
    'summary',
    'title',
    'value',
    'style',
    'xmlns',
  ]);

  const MATHML_NAMESPACE = 'http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML';
  const SVG_NAMESPACE = 'http://www.w3.org/2000/svg';
  const HTML_NAMESPACE = 'http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml';
  /* Document namespace */
  let NAMESPACE = HTML_NAMESPACE;
  let IS_EMPTY_INPUT = false;

  /* Allowed XHTML+XML namespaces */
  let ALLOWED_NAMESPACES = null;
  const DEFAULT_ALLOWED_NAMESPACES = addToSet(
    {},
    [MATHML_NAMESPACE, SVG_NAMESPACE, HTML_NAMESPACE],
    stringToString
  );

  let MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS = addToSet({}, [
    'mi',
    'mo',
    'mn',
    'ms',
    'mtext',
  ]);

  let HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS = addToSet({}, ['annotation-xml']);

  // Certain elements are allowed in both SVG and HTML
  // namespace. We need to specify them explicitly
  // so that they don't get erroneously deleted from
  // HTML namespace.
  const COMMON_SVG_AND_HTML_ELEMENTS = addToSet({}, [
    'title',
    'style',
    'font',
    'a',
    'script',
  ]);

  /* Parsing of strict XHTML documents */
  let PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE: null | DOMParserSupportedType = null;
  const SUPPORTED_PARSER_MEDIA_TYPES = ['application/xhtml+xml', 'text/html'];
  const DEFAULT_PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE = 'text/html';
  let transformCaseFunc: null | Parameters<typeof addToSet>[2] = null;

  /* Keep a reference to config to pass to hooks */
  let CONFIG: Config | null = null;

  /* Ideally, do not touch anything below this line */
  /* ______________________________________________ */

  const formElement = document.createElement('form');

  const isRegexOrFunction = function (
    testValue: unknown
  ): testValue is Function | RegExp {
    return testValue instanceof RegExp || testValue instanceof Function;
  };

  /**
   * _parseConfig
   *
   * @param cfg optional config literal
   */
  // eslint-disable-next-line complexity
  const _parseConfig = function (cfg: Config = {}): void {
    if (CONFIG && CONFIG === cfg) {
      return;
    }

    /* Shield configuration object from tampering */
    if (!cfg || typeof cfg !== 'object') {
      cfg = {};
    }

    /* Shield configuration object from prototype pollution */
    cfg = clone(cfg);

    PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE =
      // eslint-disable-next-line unicorn/prefer-includes
      SUPPORTED_PARSER_MEDIA_TYPES.indexOf(cfg.PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE) === -1
        ? DEFAULT_PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE
        : cfg.PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE;

    // HTML tags and attributes are not case-sensitive, converting to lowercase. Keeping XHTML as is.
    transformCaseFunc =
      PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE === 'application/xhtml+xml'
        ? stringToString
        : stringToLowerCase;

    /* Set configuration parameters */
    ALLOWED_TAGS =
      objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ALLOWED_TAGS') &&
      arrayIsArray(cfg.ALLOWED_TAGS)
        ? addToSet({}, cfg.ALLOWED_TAGS, transformCaseFunc)
        : DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS;
    ALLOWED_ATTR =
      objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ALLOWED_ATTR') &&
      arrayIsArray(cfg.ALLOWED_ATTR)
        ? addToSet({}, cfg.ALLOWED_ATTR, transformCaseFunc)
        : DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR;
    ALLOWED_NAMESPACES =
      objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ALLOWED_NAMESPACES') &&
      arrayIsArray(cfg.ALLOWED_NAMESPACES)
        ? addToSet({}, cfg.ALLOWED_NAMESPACES, stringToString)
        : DEFAULT_ALLOWED_NAMESPACES;
    URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES =
      objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR') &&
      arrayIsArray(cfg.ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR)
        ? addToSet(
            clone(DEFAULT_URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES),
            cfg.ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR,
            transformCaseFunc
          )
        : DEFAULT_URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES;
    DATA_URI_TAGS =
      objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ADD_DATA_URI_TAGS') &&
      arrayIsArray(cfg.ADD_DATA_URI_TAGS)
        ? addToSet(
            clone(DEFAULT_DATA_URI_TAGS),
            cfg.ADD_DATA_URI_TAGS,
            transformCaseFunc
          )
        : DEFAULT_DATA_URI_TAGS;
    FORBID_CONTENTS =
      objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'FORBID_CONTENTS') &&
      arrayIsArray(cfg.FORBID_CONTENTS)
        ? addToSet({}, cfg.FORBID_CONTENTS, transformCaseFunc)
        : DEFAULT_FORBID_CONTENTS;
    FORBID_TAGS =
      objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'FORBID_TAGS') && arrayIsArray(cfg.FORBID_TAGS)
        ? addToSet({}, cfg.FORBID_TAGS, transformCaseFunc)
        : clone({});
    FORBID_ATTR =
      objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'FORBID_ATTR') && arrayIsArray(cfg.FORBID_ATTR)
        ? addToSet({}, cfg.FORBID_ATTR, transformCaseFunc)
        : clone({});
    USE_PROFILES = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'USE_PROFILES')
      ? cfg.USE_PROFILES && typeof cfg.USE_PROFILES === 'object'
        ? clone(cfg.USE_PROFILES)
        : cfg.USE_PROFILES
      : false;

    ALLOW_ARIA_ATTR = cfg.ALLOW_ARIA_ATTR !== false; // Default true
    ALLOW_DATA_ATTR = cfg.ALLOW_DATA_ATTR !== false; // Default true
    ALLOW_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOLS = cfg.ALLOW_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOLS || false; // Default false
    ALLOW_SELF_CLOSE_IN_ATTR = cfg.ALLOW_SELF_CLOSE_IN_ATTR !== false; // Default true
    SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES = cfg.SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES || false; // Default false
    SAFE_FOR_XML = cfg.SAFE_FOR_XML !== false; // Default true
    WHOLE_DOCUMENT = cfg.WHOLE_DOCUMENT || false; // Default false
    RETURN_DOM = cfg.RETURN_DOM || false; // Default false
    RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT = cfg.RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT || false; // Default false
    RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE = cfg.RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE || false; // Default false
    FORCE_BODY = cfg.FORCE_BODY || false; // Default false
    SANITIZE_DOM = cfg.SANITIZE_DOM !== false; // Default true
    SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS = cfg.SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS || false; // Default false
    KEEP_CONTENT = cfg.KEEP_CONTENT !== false; // Default true
    IN_PLACE = cfg.IN_PLACE || false; // Default false
    IS_ALLOWED_URI = isRegex(cfg.ALLOWED_URI_REGEXP)
      ? cfg.ALLOWED_URI_REGEXP
      : EXPRESSIONS.IS_ALLOWED_URI; // Default regexp

    NAMESPACE =
      typeof cfg.NAMESPACE === 'string' ? cfg.NAMESPACE : HTML_NAMESPACE; // Default HTML namespace

    MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS =
      objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS') &&
      cfg.MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS &&
      typeof cfg.MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS === 'object'
        ? clone(cfg.MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS)
        : addToSet({}, ['mi', 'mo', 'mn', 'ms', 'mtext']); // Default built-in map

    HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS =
      objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS') &&
      cfg.HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS &&
      typeof cfg.HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS === 'object'
        ? clone(cfg.HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS)
        : addToSet({}, ['annotation-xml']); // Default built-in map

    const customElementHandling =
      objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING') &&
      cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING &&
      typeof cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING === 'object'
        ? clone(cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING)
        : create(null);

    CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING = create(null);

    if (
      objectHasOwnProperty(customElementHandling, 'tagNameCheck') &&
      isRegexOrFunction(customElementHandling.tagNameCheck)
    ) {
      CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck = customElementHandling.tagNameCheck; // Default undefined
    }

    if (
      objectHasOwnProperty(customElementHandling, 'attributeNameCheck') &&
      isRegexOrFunction(customElementHandling.attributeNameCheck)
    ) {
      CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck =
        customElementHandling.attributeNameCheck; // Default undefined
    }

    if (
      objectHasOwnProperty(
        customElementHandling,
        'allowCustomizedBuiltInElements'
      ) &&
      typeof customElementHandling.allowCustomizedBuiltInElements === 'boolean'
    ) {
      CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.allowCustomizedBuiltInElements =
        customElementHandling.allowCustomizedBuiltInElements; // Default undefined
    }

    if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
      ALLOW_DATA_ATTR = false;
    }

    if (RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT) {
      RETURN_DOM = true;
    }

    /* Parse profile info */
    if (USE_PROFILES) {
      ALLOWED_TAGS = addToSet({}, TAGS.text);
      ALLOWED_ATTR = create(null);
      if (USE_PROFILES.html === true) {
        addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, TAGS.html);
        addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, ATTRS.html);
      }

      if (USE_PROFILES.svg === true) {
        addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, TAGS.svg);
        addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, ATTRS.svg);
        addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, ATTRS.xml);
      }

      if (USE_PROFILES.svgFilters === true) {
        addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, TAGS.svgFilters);
        addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, ATTRS.svg);
        addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, ATTRS.xml);
      }

      if (USE_PROFILES.mathMl === true) {
        addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, TAGS.mathMl);
        addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, ATTRS.mathMl);
        addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, ATTRS.xml);
      }
    }

    /* Always reset function-based ADD_TAGS / ADD_ATTR checks to prevent
     * leaking across calls when switching from function to array config */
    EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck = null;
    EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeCheck = null;

    /* Merge configuration parameters */
    if (objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ADD_TAGS')) {
      if (typeof cfg.ADD_TAGS === 'function') {
        EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck = cfg.ADD_TAGS;
      } else if (arrayIsArray(cfg.ADD_TAGS)) {
        if (ALLOWED_TAGS === DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS) {
          ALLOWED_TAGS = clone(ALLOWED_TAGS);
        }

        addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, cfg.ADD_TAGS, transformCaseFunc);
      }
    }

    if (objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ADD_ATTR')) {
      if (typeof cfg.ADD_ATTR === 'function') {
        EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeCheck = cfg.ADD_ATTR;
      } else if (arrayIsArray(cfg.ADD_ATTR)) {
        if (ALLOWED_ATTR === DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR) {
          ALLOWED_ATTR = clone(ALLOWED_ATTR);
        }

        addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, cfg.ADD_ATTR, transformCaseFunc);
      }
    }

    if (
      objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR') &&
      arrayIsArray(cfg.ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR)
    ) {
      addToSet(URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES, cfg.ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR, transformCaseFunc);
    }

    if (
      objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'FORBID_CONTENTS') &&
      arrayIsArray(cfg.FORBID_CONTENTS)
    ) {
      if (FORBID_CONTENTS === DEFAULT_FORBID_CONTENTS) {
        FORBID_CONTENTS = clone(FORBID_CONTENTS);
      }

      addToSet(FORBID_CONTENTS, cfg.FORBID_CONTENTS, transformCaseFunc);
    }

    if (
      objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ADD_FORBID_CONTENTS') &&
      arrayIsArray(cfg.ADD_FORBID_CONTENTS)
    ) {
      if (FORBID_CONTENTS === DEFAULT_FORBID_CONTENTS) {
        FORBID_CONTENTS = clone(FORBID_CONTENTS);
      }

      addToSet(FORBID_CONTENTS, cfg.ADD_FORBID_CONTENTS, transformCaseFunc);
    }

    /* Add #text in case KEEP_CONTENT is set to true */
    if (KEEP_CONTENT) {
      ALLOWED_TAGS['#text'] = true;
    }

    /* Add html, head and body to ALLOWED_TAGS in case WHOLE_DOCUMENT is true */
    if (WHOLE_DOCUMENT) {
      addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, ['html', 'head', 'body']);
    }

    /* Add tbody to ALLOWED_TAGS in case tables are permitted, see #286, #365 */
    if (ALLOWED_TAGS.table) {
      addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, ['tbody']);
      delete FORBID_TAGS.tbody;
    }

    // Re-derive the active Trusted Types policy from this configuration on
    // every parse. The active policy must never be sticky closure state that
    // outlives the config that set it: a caller-supplied policy left in place
    // after `clearConfig()` — or after a later call that supplied none, or
    // `TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY: null` — could sign a subsequent "default"
    // `RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE` result with a foreign, possibly unsafe policy.
    // See GHSA-vxr8-fq34-vvx9.
    if (cfg.TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY) {
      if (typeof cfg.TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY.createHTML !== 'function') {
        throw typeErrorCreate(
          'TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY configuration option must provide a "createHTML" hook.'
        );
      }

      if (typeof cfg.TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY.createScriptURL !== 'function') {
        throw typeErrorCreate(
          'TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY configuration option must provide a "createScriptURL" hook.'
        );
      }

      // A caller-supplied policy applies to this configuration only.
      const previousTrustedTypesPolicy = trustedTypesPolicy;
      trustedTypesPolicy = cfg.TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY;

      // Sign local variables required by `sanitize`. If the supplied policy's
      // `createHTML` is circular (i.e. it calls `DOMPurify.sanitize`), this
      // throws via the re-entrancy guard. Restore the previous policy first so
      // the instance is not left in a poisoned state. See #1422.
      try {
        emptyHTML = _createTrustedHTML('');
      } catch (error) {
        trustedTypesPolicy = previousTrustedTypesPolicy;
        throw error;
      }
    } else if (cfg.TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY === null) {
      // Explicit opt-out for this call: perform no Trusted Types signing and
      // create nothing (so a strict `trusted-types` CSP that disallows a
      // `dompurify` policy can still call `sanitize` from inside its own
      // policy — see #1422). Resetting to `undefined` rather than a sticky
      // `null` also drops any previously retained caller policy, so it cannot
      // resurface on a later call, while still allowing the next config-less
      // call to restore the internal default policy. See GHSA-vxr8-fq34-vvx9.
      trustedTypesPolicy = undefined;
      emptyHTML = '';
    } else {
      // No policy supplied: keep the currently active policy if one is set — a
      // previously supplied policy is intentionally sticky across config-less
      // calls — otherwise fall back to the instance's own internal policy,
      // created at most once. (A policy supplied for a *single* call still
      // lingers by design; what must not linger is a policy whose configuration
      // has been torn down via `clearConfig()`, which restores the default.)
      if (trustedTypesPolicy === undefined) {
        trustedTypesPolicy = _getDefaultTrustedTypesPolicy();
      }

      // Sign internal variables only when a policy is active. A falsy policy
      // (Trusted Types unsupported, creation failed, or an explicit opt-out)
      // leaves `emptyHTML` as a plain string, so we never call `.createHTML` on
      // a non-policy and throw. See #1422.
      if (trustedTypesPolicy && typeof emptyHTML === 'string') {
        emptyHTML = _createTrustedHTML('');
      }
    }

    /*
     * Mirror the clone-before-mutate pattern already applied above for
     * cfg.ADD_TAGS / cfg.ADD_ATTR: if any uponSanitize* hook is
     * registered AND the set still points at the default constant,
     * clone it. The hook then mutates the clone (in-call widening
     * still works exactly as documented) and the next default-cfg
     * call rebinds to the untouched original via the reassignment at
     * the top of this function.
     */
    if (
      (hooks.uponSanitizeElement.length > 0 ||
        hooks.uponSanitizeAttribute.length > 0) &&
      ALLOWED_TAGS === DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS
    ) {
      ALLOWED_TAGS = clone(ALLOWED_TAGS);
    }

    if (
      hooks.uponSanitizeAttribute.length > 0 &&
      ALLOWED_ATTR === DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR
    ) {
      ALLOWED_ATTR = clone(ALLOWED_ATTR);
    }

    // Prevent further manipulation of configuration.
    // Not available in IE8, Safari 5, etc.
    if (freeze) {
      freeze(cfg);
    }

    CONFIG = cfg;
  };

  /* Keep track of all possible SVG and MathML tags
   * so that we can perform the namespace checks
   * correctly. */
  const ALL_SVG_TAGS = addToSet({}, [
    ...TAGS.svg,
    ...TAGS.svgFilters,
    ...TAGS.svgDisallowed,
  ]);
  const ALL_MATHML_TAGS = addToSet({}, [
    ...TAGS.mathMl,
    ...TAGS.mathMlDisallowed,
  ]);

  /**
   * @param element a DOM element whose namespace is being checked
   * @returns Return false if the element has a
   *  namespace that a spec-compliant parser would never
   *  return. Return true otherwise.
   */
  const _checkValidNamespace = function (element: Element): boolean {
    let parent = getParentNode(element);

    // In JSDOM, if we're inside shadow DOM, then parentNode
    // can be null. We just simulate parent in this case.
    if (!parent || !parent.tagName) {
      parent = {
        namespaceURI: NAMESPACE,
        tagName: 'template',
      };
    }

    const tagName = stringToLowerCase(element.tagName);
    const parentTagName = stringToLowerCase(parent.tagName);

    if (!ALLOWED_NAMESPACES[element.namespaceURI]) {
      return false;
    }

    if (element.namespaceURI === SVG_NAMESPACE) {
      // The only way to switch from HTML namespace to SVG
      // is via <svg>. If it happens via any other tag, then
      // it should be killed.
      if (parent.namespaceURI === HTML_NAMESPACE) {
        return tagName === 'svg';
      }

      // The only way to switch from MathML to SVG is via`
      // svg if parent is either <annotation-xml> or MathML
      // text integration points.
      if (parent.namespaceURI === MATHML_NAMESPACE) {
        return (
          tagName === 'svg' &&
          (parentTagName === 'annotation-xml' ||
            MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS[parentTagName])
        );
      }

      // We only allow elements that are defined in SVG
      // spec. All others are disallowed in SVG namespace.
      return Boolean(ALL_SVG_TAGS[tagName]);
    }

    if (element.namespaceURI === MATHML_NAMESPACE) {
      // The only way to switch from HTML namespace to MathML
      // is via <math>. If it happens via any other tag, then
      // it should be killed.
      if (parent.namespaceURI === HTML_NAMESPACE) {
        return tagName === 'math';
      }

      // The only way to switch from SVG to MathML is via
      // <math> and HTML integration points
      if (parent.namespaceURI === SVG_NAMESPACE) {
        return tagName === 'math' && HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS[parentTagName];
      }

      // We only allow elements that are defined in MathML
      // spec. All others are disallowed in MathML namespace.
      return Boolean(ALL_MATHML_TAGS[tagName]);
    }

    if (element.namespaceURI === HTML_NAMESPACE) {
      // The only way to switch from SVG to HTML is via
      // HTML integration points, and from MathML to HTML
      // is via MathML text integration points
      if (
        parent.namespaceURI === SVG_NAMESPACE &&
        !HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS[parentTagName]
      ) {
        return false;
      }

      if (
        parent.namespaceURI === MATHML_NAMESPACE &&
        !MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS[parentTagName]
      ) {
        return false;
      }

      // We disallow tags that are specific for MathML
      // or SVG and should never appear in HTML namespace
      return (
        !ALL_MATHML_TAGS[tagName] &&
        (COMMON_SVG_AND_HTML_ELEMENTS[tagName] || !ALL_SVG_TAGS[tagName])
      );
    }

    // For XHTML and XML documents that support custom namespaces
    if (
      PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE === 'application/xhtml+xml' &&
      ALLOWED_NAMESPACES[element.namespaceURI]
    ) {
      return true;
    }

    // The code should never reach this place (this means
    // that the element somehow got namespace that is not
    // HTML, SVG, MathML or allowed via ALLOWED_NAMESPACES).
    // Return false just in case.
    return false;
  };

  /**
   * _forceRemove
   *
   * @param node a DOM node
   */
  const _forceRemove = function (node: Node): void {
    arrayPush(DOMPurify.removed, { element: node });

    try {
      // eslint-disable-next-line unicorn/prefer-dom-node-remove
      getParentNode(node).removeChild(node);
    } catch (_) {
      /* The normal detach failed — this is reached for a parentless node
         (getParentNode() is null, so .removeChild throws). Element.prototype
         .remove() is itself a spec no-op on a parentless node, so a recorded
         "removal" would otherwise hand the caller back an intact,
         payload-bearing node (e.g. a detached IN_PLACE root the mXSS canary or
         the style-with-element-child rule decided to kill). Fail closed by
         throwing — exactly as a clobbered root does at the IN_PLACE entry —
         rather than trying to "neutralize" the node via its own methods.
         Neutralizing would mean calling getAttributeNames()/removeAttribute()
         on the node, both of which a <form> root can clobber via a named child
         (and _isClobbered does not even probe getAttributeNames), so the
         neutralize step could itself be silently defeated, leaving the payload
         intact. A throw touches only the cached, clobber-safe remove() and
         getParentNode(). Generalizes GHSA-r47g-fvhr-h676 (clobbered-form root)
         to every root-kill reason. REPORT-3.

         This lives inside the catch, so it never fires for a normally-removed
         in-tree node: those have a parent, removeChild() succeeds, and the
         catch is not entered. Only a kept (parentless) root reaches here. */
      remove(node);

      if (!getParentNode(node)) {
        throw typeErrorCreate(
          'a node selected for removal could not be detached from its tree ' +
            'and cannot be safely returned; refusing to sanitize in place'
        );
      }
    }
  };

  /**
   * _neutralizeRoot
   *
   * Fail-closed teardown of an in-place root after the sanitize walk aborts
   * (campaign-3 F2). An internal throw mid-walk — e.g. a page-registered
   * custom element's reaction detaches a node so `_forceRemove`'s deliberate
   * parentless guard throws, or any other re-entrant engine mutation — would
   * otherwise leave the caller's *live* tree half-sanitized, with everything
   * after the abort point still carrying its handlers. There is no safe way
   * to resume the walk (the tree mutated under us), so we strip the root bare:
   * remove every child and every attribute, then let the caller's catch see
   * the original error. Clobber-safe (cached `remove`/`childNodes`/`attributes`
   * getters; the root was already clobber-pre-flighted at the IN_PLACE entry).
   *
   * @param root the in-place root to empty
   */
  const _neutralizeRoot = function (root: Node): void {
    const childNodes = getChildNodes
      ? getChildNodes(root)
      : (root as Element).childNodes;
    if (childNodes) {
      const snapshot: Node[] = [];
      arrayForEach(childNodes, (child) => {
        arrayPush(snapshot, child);
      });
      arrayForEach(snapshot, (child) => {
        try {
          remove(child);
        } catch (_) {
          /* Best-effort teardown; a still-attached child is handled below */
        }
      });
    }

    const attributes = getAttributes ? getAttributes(root) : null;
    if (attributes) {
      for (let i = attributes.length - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
        const attribute = attributes[i];
        const name = attribute && attribute.name;
        if (typeof name === 'string') {
          try {
            (root as Element).removeAttribute(name);
          } catch (_) {
            /* Clobbered removeAttribute — ignore (fail-closed best effort) */
          }
        }
      }
    }
  };

  /**
   * _removeAttribute
   *
   * @param name an Attribute name
   * @param element a DOM node
   */
  const _removeAttribute = function (name: string, element: Element): void {
    try {
      arrayPush(DOMPurify.removed, {
        attribute: element.getAttributeNode(name),
        from: element,
      });
    } catch (_) {
      arrayPush(DOMPurify.removed, {
        attribute: null,
        from: element,
      });
    }

    element.removeAttribute(name);

    // We void attribute values for unremovable "is" attributes
    if (name === 'is') {
      if (RETURN_DOM || RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT) {
        try {
          _forceRemove(element);
        } catch (_) {}
      } else {
        try {
          element.setAttribute(name, '');
        } catch (_) {}
      }
    }
  };

  /**
   * _stripDisallowedAttributes
   *
   * Removes every attribute the active configuration does not allow from a
   * single element, using the same allowlist as the main attribute pass (so
   * `on*` handlers go, but no `/^on/` blocklist is introduced). Used only to
   * neutralise nodes that are being discarded from an in-place tree.
   *
   * @param element the element to strip
   */
  const _stripDisallowedAttributes = function (element: Element): void {
    const attributes = getAttributes
      ? getAttributes(element)
      : element.attributes;
    if (!attributes) {
      return;
    }

    for (let i = attributes.length - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
      const attribute = attributes[i];
      const name = attribute && attribute.name;
      if (typeof name !== 'string' || ALLOWED_ATTR[transformCaseFunc(name)]) {
        continue;
      }

      try {
        element.removeAttribute(name);
      } catch (_) {
        /* Clobbered removeAttribute on a doomed node — ignore */
      }
    }
  };

  /**
   * _neutralizeSubtree
   *
   * Completes the audit-5 F1 fix across every removal path. The KEEP_CONTENT
   * move-hoist neutralises only disallowed-tag removals; clobber, mXSS-canary,
   * namespace, comment, processing-instruction and KEEP_CONTENT:false removals
   * all drop their subtree wholesale via `_forceRemove`. On the IN_PLACE path
   * those dropped nodes are detached from the caller's LIVE tree but a
   * handler-bearing original among them (an `<img onerror>`/`<video>` that was
   * loading) keeps its queued resource event, which fires in page scope after
   * sanitize returns. This walks a removed subtree and strips every attribute
   * the active configuration does not allow — so `on*` handlers are cancelled
   * through the SAME allowlist that governs kept nodes, not a separate `/^on/`
   * blocklist. Run synchronously before sanitize returns, i.e. before any
   * queued event can fire. Hook-free by design: these nodes leave the output,
   * so firing attribute hooks for them would be surprising. Clobber-safe reads;
   * a doomed clobbered node may shadow `removeAttribute` (its own attributes are
   * irrelevant — it is discarded — while its non-clobbered descendants, e.g.
   * the `<img>`, are reached and scrubbed).
   *
   * @param root the root of a removed subtree to neutralise
   */
  const _neutralizeSubtree = function (root: Node): void {
    const stack: Node[] = [root];

    while (stack.length > 0) {
      const node = stack.pop();
      const nodeType = getNodeType ? getNodeType(node) : (node as any).nodeType;

      if (nodeType === NODE_TYPE.element) {
        _stripDisallowedAttributes(node as Element);
      }

      const childNodes = getChildNodes
        ? getChildNodes(node)
        : (node as Element).childNodes;
      if (childNodes) {
        for (let i = childNodes.length - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
          stack.push(childNodes[i]);
        }
      }
    }
  };

  /**
   * _initDocument
   *
   * @param dirty - a string of dirty markup
   * @return a DOM, filled with the dirty markup
   */
  const _initDocument = function (dirty: string): Document {
    /* Create a HTML document */
    let doc = null;
    let leadingWhitespace = null;

    if (FORCE_BODY) {
      dirty = '<remove></remove>' + dirty;
    } else {
      /* If FORCE_BODY isn't used, leading whitespace needs to be preserved manually */
      const matches = stringMatch(dirty, /^[\r\n\t ]+/);
      leadingWhitespace = matches && matches[0];
    }

    if (
      PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE === 'application/xhtml+xml' &&
      NAMESPACE === HTML_NAMESPACE
    ) {
      // Root of XHTML doc must contain xmlns declaration (see https://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/normative.html#strict)
      dirty =
        '<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><head></head><body>' +
        dirty +
        '</body></html>';
    }

    const dirtyPayload = trustedTypesPolicy ? _createTrustedHTML(dirty) : dirty;
    /*
     * Use the DOMParser API by default, fallback later if needs be
     * DOMParser not work for svg when has multiple root element.
     */
    if (NAMESPACE === HTML_NAMESPACE) {
      try {
        doc = new DOMParser().parseFromString(dirtyPayload, PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE);
      } catch (_) {}
    }

    /* Use createHTMLDocument in case DOMParser is not available */
    if (!doc || !doc.documentElement) {
      doc = implementation.createDocument(NAMESPACE, 'template', null);
      try {
        doc.documentElement.innerHTML = IS_EMPTY_INPUT
          ? emptyHTML
          : dirtyPayload;
      } catch (_) {
        // Syntax error if dirtyPayload is invalid xml
      }
    }

    const body = doc.body || doc.documentElement;

    if (dirty && leadingWhitespace) {
      body.insertBefore(
        document.createTextNode(leadingWhitespace),
        body.childNodes[0] || null
      );
    }

    /* Work on whole document or just its body */
    if (NAMESPACE === HTML_NAMESPACE) {
      return getElementsByTagName.call(
        doc,
        WHOLE_DOCUMENT ? 'html' : 'body'
      )[0];
    }

    return WHOLE_DOCUMENT ? doc.documentElement : body;
  };

  /**
   * Creates a NodeIterator object that you can use to traverse filtered lists of nodes or elements in a document.
   *
   * @param root The root element or node to start traversing on.
   * @return The created NodeIterator
   */
  const _createNodeIterator = function (root: Node): NodeIterator {
    return createNodeIterator.call(
      root.ownerDocument || root,
      root,
      // eslint-disable-next-line no-bitwise
      NodeFilter.SHOW_ELEMENT |
        NodeFilter.SHOW_COMMENT |
        NodeFilter.SHOW_TEXT |
        NodeFilter.SHOW_PROCESSING_INSTRUCTION |
        NodeFilter.SHOW_CDATA_SECTION,
      null
    );
  };

  /**
   * Strip template-engine expressions ({{...}}, ${...}, <%...%>) from the
   * character data of an element subtree. Used as the final safety net for
   * SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES on every DOM-returning code path so that expressions
   * which only form after text-node normalization (e.g. fragments split across
   * stripped elements) cannot survive into a template-evaluating framework.
   *
   * Walks text/comment/CDATA/processing-instruction nodes and mutates `.data`
   * in place rather than round-tripping through innerHTML. This preserves
   * descendant node references (important for IN_PLACE callers), avoids a
   * serialize/reparse cycle, and reads literal character data — which means
   * `<%...%>` in text content matches the ERB regex against its real bytes
   * instead of the HTML-entity-escaped form innerHTML would produce.
   *
   * Attribute values are not visited here; SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES handling for
   * attributes is performed during the per-node `_sanitizeAttributes` pass.
   *
   * @param node The root element whose character data should be scrubbed.
   */
  const _scrubTemplateExpressions = function (node: Element): void {
    node.normalize();
    const walker = createNodeIterator.call(
      node.ownerDocument || node,
      node,
      // eslint-disable-next-line no-bitwise
      NodeFilter.SHOW_TEXT |
        NodeFilter.SHOW_COMMENT |
        NodeFilter.SHOW_CDATA_SECTION |
        NodeFilter.SHOW_PROCESSING_INSTRUCTION,
      null
    );

    let currentNode = walker.nextNode() as CharacterData | null;
    while (currentNode) {
      let data = currentNode.data;
      arrayForEach([MUSTACHE_EXPR, ERB_EXPR, TMPLIT_EXPR], (expr: RegExp) => {
        data = stringReplace(data, expr, ' ');
      });
      currentNode.data = data;
      currentNode = walker.nextNode() as CharacterData | null;
    }

    // NodeIterator does not descend into <template>.content per the DOM spec,
    // so we must explicitly recurse into each template's content fragment,
    // mirroring the approach used by _sanitizeShadowDOM.
    const templates = node.querySelectorAll?.('template') ?? [];
    arrayForEach(Array.from(templates), (tmpl: HTMLTemplateElement) => {
      if (_isDocumentFragment(tmpl.content)) {
        _scrubTemplateExpressions(tmpl.content as unknown as Element);
      }
    });
  };

  /**
   * _isClobbered
   *
   * Detect DOM-clobbering on HTMLFormElement nodes. Form is the only HTML
   * interface with [LegacyOverrideBuiltIns]; a descendant element with a
   * `name` attribute matching a prototype property shadows that property
   * on direct reads. We use this check at the IN_PLACE entry-point and
   * during attribute sanitization to refuse clobbered forms.
   *
   * @param element element to check for clobbering attacks
   * @return true if clobbered, false if safe
   */
  const _isClobbered = function (element: Element): boolean {
    // Realm-independent tag-name probe. If we can't determine the tag
    // name at all, we can't reason about clobbering — return false
    // (the caller's other defences still apply).
    const realTagName = getNodeName ? getNodeName(element) : null;
    if (typeof realTagName !== 'string') {
      return false;
    }

    if (transformCaseFunc(realTagName) !== 'form') {
      return false;
    }

    return (
      typeof element.nodeName !== 'string' ||
      typeof element.textContent !== 'string' ||
      typeof element.removeChild !== 'function' ||
      // Realm-safe NamedNodeMap detection: equality against the cached
      // prototype getter. Clobbered .attributes (e.g. <input name="attributes">)
      // makes the direct read diverge from the cached read; a clean form
      // (same-realm OR foreign-realm) has both reads pointing at the same
      // canonical NamedNodeMap.
      element.attributes !== getAttributes(element) ||
      typeof element.removeAttribute !== 'function' ||
      typeof element.setAttribute !== 'function' ||
      typeof element.namespaceURI !== 'string' ||
      typeof element.insertBefore !== 'function' ||
      typeof element.hasChildNodes !== 'function' ||
      // NodeType clobbering probe. Cached Node.prototype.nodeType getter
      // returns the integer 1 for any Element regardless of realm; direct
      // read on a clobbered form (e.g. <input name="nodeType">) returns
      // the named child element. Cheap addition — nodeType is read from
      // an internal slot, no serialization cost — and removes a residual
      // clobbering surface used by several mXSS / PI / comment branches
      // in _sanitizeElements that compare currentNode.nodeType directly.
      element.nodeType !== getNodeType(element) ||
      // HTMLFormElement has [LegacyOverrideBuiltIns]: a descendant named
      // "childNodes" shadows the prototype getter. Direct reads of
      // form.childNodes from a clobbered form return the named child
      // instead of the real NodeList, so any walk that reads it directly
      // skips the form's real children. Compare the direct read to the
      // cached Node.prototype getter — when the form's named-property
      // getter intercepts the read, the two values differ and we flag
      // the form. This catches every clobbering child type (input,
      // select, etc.) regardless of whether the named child happens to
      // carry a numeric .length, which a typeof-based probe would miss
      // (e.g. HTMLSelectElement.length is a defined unsigned-long).
      element.childNodes !== getChildNodes(element)
    );
  };

  /**
   * Checks whether the given value is a DocumentFragment from any realm.
   *
   * The realm-independent replacement reads `nodeType` through the cached
   * Node.prototype getter and compares to the DOCUMENT_FRAGMENT_NODE
   * constant (11). nodeType is a numeric value resolved from the node's
   * internal slot, identical across realms for the same kind of node.
   *
   * @param value object to check
   * @return true if value is a DocumentFragment-shaped node from any realm
   */
  const _isDocumentFragment = function (value: unknown): boolean {
    if (!getNodeType || typeof value !== 'object' || value === null) {
      return false;
    }

    try {
      return getNodeType(value as Node) === NODE_TYPE.documentFragment;
    } catch (_) {
      return false;
    }
  };

  /**
   * Checks whether the given object is a DOM node, including nodes that
   * originate from a different window/realm (e.g. an iframe's
   * contentDocument). The previous `value instanceof Node` check was
   * realm-bound: nodes from a different window failed it, causing
   * sanitize() to silently stringify them and reset IN_PLACE to false,
   * returning the original node unsanitized. See GHSA-4w3q-35jp-p934.
   *
   * @param value object to check whether it's a DOM node
   * @return true if value is a DOM node from any realm
   */
  const _isNode = function (value: unknown): value is Node {
    if (!getNodeType || typeof value !== 'object' || value === null) {
      return false;
    }

    try {
      return typeof getNodeType(value) === 'number';
    } catch (_) {
      return false;
    }
  };

  function _executeHooks<T extends HookFunction>(
    hooks: HookFunction[],
    currentNode: Parameters<T>[0],
    data: Parameters<T>[1]
  ): void {
    arrayForEach(hooks, (hook: T) => {
      hook.call(DOMPurify, currentNode, data, CONFIG);
    });
  }

  /**
   * _sanitizeElements
   *
   * @protect nodeName
   * @protect textContent
   * @protect removeChild
   * @param currentNode to check for permission to exist
   * @return true if node was killed, false if left alive
   */
  const _sanitizeElements = function (currentNode: any): boolean {
    let content = null;

    /* Execute a hook if present */
    _executeHooks(hooks.beforeSanitizeElements, currentNode, null);

    /* Check if element is clobbered or can clobber */
    if (_isClobbered(currentNode)) {
      _forceRemove(currentNode);
      return true;
    }

    /* Now let's check the element's type and name */
    const tagName = transformCaseFunc(
      getNodeName ? getNodeName(currentNode) : currentNode.nodeName
    );

    /* Execute a hook if present */
    _executeHooks(hooks.uponSanitizeElement, currentNode, {
      tagName,
      allowedTags: ALLOWED_TAGS,
    });

    /* Detect mXSS attempts abusing namespace confusion */
    if (
      SAFE_FOR_XML &&
      currentNode.hasChildNodes() &&
      !_isNode(currentNode.firstElementChild) &&
      regExpTest(/<[/\w!]/g, currentNode.innerHTML) &&
      regExpTest(/<[/\w!]/g, currentNode.textContent)
    ) {
      _forceRemove(currentNode);
      return true;
    }

    /* Remove risky CSS construction leading to mXSS */
    if (
      SAFE_FOR_XML &&
      currentNode.namespaceURI === HTML_NAMESPACE &&
      tagName === 'style' &&
      _isNode(currentNode.firstElementChild)
    ) {
      _forceRemove(currentNode);
      return true;
    }

    /* Remove any occurrence of processing instructions */
    if (currentNode.nodeType === NODE_TYPE.progressingInstruction) {
      _forceRemove(currentNode);
      return true;
    }

    /* Remove any kind of possibly harmful comments */
    if (
      SAFE_FOR_XML &&
      currentNode.nodeType === NODE_TYPE.comment &&
      regExpTest(/<[/\w]/g, currentNode.data)
    ) {
      _forceRemove(currentNode);
      return true;
    }

    /* Remove element if anything forbids its presence */
    if (
      FORBID_TAGS[tagName] ||
      (!(
        EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck instanceof Function &&
        EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck(tagName)
      ) &&
        !ALLOWED_TAGS[tagName])
    ) {
      /* Check if we have a custom element to handle */
      if (!FORBID_TAGS[tagName] && _isBasicCustomElement(tagName)) {
        if (
          CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof RegExp &&
          regExpTest(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck, tagName)
        ) {
          return false;
        }

        if (
          CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof Function &&
          CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck(tagName)
        ) {
          return false;
        }
      }

      /* Keep content except for bad-listed elements.
         Use the cached prototype getters exclusively — the previous code
         had `|| currentNode.parentNode` / `|| currentNode.childNodes`
         fallbacks, but the cached getters always return the canonical
         value (or null for a real parent-less node), so the fallback
         path was dead in safe cases and a clobbering surface in unsafe
         ones. Falsy cached results stay falsy; the `if (childNodes &&
         parentNode)` check already gates correctly. */
      if (KEEP_CONTENT && !FORBID_CONTENTS[tagName]) {
        const parentNode = getParentNode(currentNode);
        const childNodes = getChildNodes(currentNode);

        if (childNodes && parentNode) {
          const childCount = childNodes.length;

          /* In-place: hoist the *original* children so the iterator visits
             and sanitises them through the same allowlist pass as every other
             node. The caller built the tree in the live document, so the
             originals carry already-queued resource events (`<img onerror>`,
             `<video>`/`<audio>` error, lazy/`onload`, …); cloning would leave
             those originals detached but still armed, firing in page scope
             while the returned tree looked clean. Moving is safe in-place: the
             root is pre-validated as an allowed tag and so is never the node
             being removed, which keeps `parentNode` inside the iterator root
             and the relocated child inside the serialised tree.

             Otherwise (string / DOM-copy paths): clone. The iterator is rooted
             at — and the result serialised from — `body`, so a restrictive
             ALLOWED_TAGS that removes `body` itself must leave its content in
             place, which only cloning does; and those paths parse into an
             inert document, so their discarded originals never had a queued
             event to neutralise.

             `childNodes` is live; a tail-to-head walk keeps `childNodes[i]`
             valid whether we move (drops the trailing entry) or clone (leaves
             the list intact). */
          for (let i = childCount - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
            const hoisted = IN_PLACE
              ? childNodes[i]
              : cloneNode(childNodes[i], true);
            parentNode.insertBefore(hoisted, getNextSibling(currentNode));
          }
        }
      }

      _forceRemove(currentNode);
      return true;
    }

    /* Check whether element has a valid namespace.
       Realm-safe check (GHSA-hpcv-96wg-7vj8): use the cached Node.prototype
       nodeType getter rather than `instanceof Element`, which is realm-
       bound and short-circuits to false for any node minted in a different
       realm — letting a foreign-realm element with a forbidden namespace
       slip past the namespace check entirely. */
    const nt = getNodeType ? getNodeType(currentNode) : currentNode.nodeType;
    if (nt === NODE_TYPE.element && !_checkValidNamespace(currentNode)) {
      _forceRemove(currentNode);
      return true;
    }

    /* Make sure that older browsers don't get fallback-tag mXSS */
    if (
      (tagName === 'noscript' ||
        tagName === 'noembed' ||
        tagName === 'noframes') &&
      regExpTest(/<\/no(script|embed|frames)/i, currentNode.innerHTML)
    ) {
      _forceRemove(currentNode);
      return true;
    }

    /* Sanitize element content to be template-safe */
    if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES && currentNode.nodeType === NODE_TYPE.text) {
      /* Get the element's text content */
      content = currentNode.textContent;

      arrayForEach([MUSTACHE_EXPR, ERB_EXPR, TMPLIT_EXPR], (expr: RegExp) => {
        content = stringReplace(content, expr, ' ');
      });

      if (currentNode.textContent !== content) {
        arrayPush(DOMPurify.removed, { element: currentNode.cloneNode() });
        currentNode.textContent = content;
      }
    }

    /* Execute a hook if present */
    _executeHooks(hooks.afterSanitizeElements, currentNode, null);

    return false;
  };

  /**
   * _isValidAttribute
   *
   * @param lcTag Lowercase tag name of containing element.
   * @param lcName Lowercase attribute name.
   * @param value Attribute value.
   * @return Returns true if `value` is valid, otherwise false.
   */
  // eslint-disable-next-line complexity
  const _isValidAttribute = function (
    lcTag: string,
    lcName: string,
    value: string
  ): boolean {
    /* FORBID_ATTR must always win, even if ADD_ATTR predicate would allow it */
    if (FORBID_ATTR[lcName]) {
      return false;
    }

    /* Make sure attribute cannot clobber */
    if (
      SANITIZE_DOM &&
      (lcName === 'id' || lcName === 'name') &&
      (value in document || value in formElement)
    ) {
      return false;
    }

    const nameIsPermitted =
      ALLOWED_ATTR[lcName] ||
      (EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeCheck instanceof Function &&
        EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeCheck(lcName, lcTag));

    /* Allow valid data-* attributes: At least one character after "-"
        (https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/dom.html#embedding-custom-non-visible-data-with-the-data-*-attributes)
        XML-compatible (https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/infrastructure.html#xml-compatible and http://www.w3.org/TR/xml/#d0e804)
        We don't need to check the value; it's always URI safe. */
    if (
      ALLOW_DATA_ATTR &&
      !FORBID_ATTR[lcName] &&
      regExpTest(DATA_ATTR, lcName)
    ) {
      // This attribute is safe
    } else if (ALLOW_ARIA_ATTR && regExpTest(ARIA_ATTR, lcName)) {
      // This attribute is safe
      /* Otherwise, check the name is permitted */
    } else if (!nameIsPermitted || FORBID_ATTR[lcName]) {
      if (
        // First condition does a very basic check if a) it's basically a valid custom element tagname AND
        // b) if the tagName passes whatever the user has configured for CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck
        // and c) if the attribute name passes whatever the user has configured for CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck
        (_isBasicCustomElement(lcTag) &&
          ((CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof RegExp &&
            regExpTest(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck, lcTag)) ||
            (CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof Function &&
              CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck(lcTag))) &&
          ((CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck instanceof RegExp &&
            regExpTest(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck, lcName)) ||
            (CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck instanceof Function &&
              CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck(lcName, lcTag)))) ||
        // Alternative, second condition checks if it's an `is`-attribute, AND
        // the value passes whatever the user has configured for CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck
        (lcName === 'is' &&
          CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.allowCustomizedBuiltInElements &&
          ((CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof RegExp &&
            regExpTest(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck, value)) ||
            (CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof Function &&
              CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck(value))))
      ) {
        // If user has supplied a regexp or function in CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck, we need to also allow derived custom elements using the same tagName test.
        // Additionally, we need to allow attributes passing the CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck user has configured, as custom elements can define these at their own discretion.
      } else {
        return false;
      }
      /* Check value is safe. First, is attr inert? If so, is safe */
    } else if (URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES[lcName]) {
      // This attribute is safe
      /* Check no script, data or unknown possibly unsafe URI
        unless we know URI values are safe for that attribute */
    } else if (
      regExpTest(IS_ALLOWED_URI, stringReplace(value, ATTR_WHITESPACE, ''))
    ) {
      // This attribute is safe
      /* Keep image data URIs alive if src/xlink:href is allowed */
      /* Further prevent gadget XSS for dynamically built script tags */
    } else if (
      (lcName === 'src' || lcName === 'xlink:href' || lcName === 'href') &&
      lcTag !== 'script' &&
      stringIndexOf(value, 'data:') === 0 &&
      DATA_URI_TAGS[lcTag]
    ) {
      // This attribute is safe
      /* Allow unknown protocols: This provides support for links that
        are handled by protocol handlers which may be unknown ahead of
        time, e.g. fb:, spotify: */
    } else if (
      ALLOW_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOLS &&
      !regExpTest(IS_SCRIPT_OR_DATA, stringReplace(value, ATTR_WHITESPACE, ''))
    ) {
      // This attribute is safe
      /* Check for binary attributes */
    } else if (value) {
      return false;
    } else {
      // Binary attributes are safe at this point
      /* Anything else, presume unsafe, do not add it back */
    }

    return true;
  };

  /* Names the HTML spec reserves from valid-custom-element-name; these must
   * never be treated as basic custom elements even when a permissive
   * CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck is configured. */
  const RESERVED_CUSTOM_ELEMENT_NAMES = addToSet({}, [
    'annotation-xml',
    'color-profile',
    'font-face',
    'font-face-format',
    'font-face-name',
    'font-face-src',
    'font-face-uri',
    'missing-glyph',
  ]);

  /**
   * _isBasicCustomElement
   * checks if at least one dash is included in tagName, and it's not the first char
   * for more sophisticated checking see https://github.com/sindresorhus/validate-element-name
   *
   * @param tagName name of the tag of the node to sanitize
   * @returns Returns true if the tag name meets the basic criteria for a custom element, otherwise false.
   */
  const _isBasicCustomElement = function (tagName: string): boolean {
    return (
      !RESERVED_CUSTOM_ELEMENT_NAMES[stringToLowerCase(tagName)] &&
      regExpTest(CUSTOM_ELEMENT, tagName)
    );
  };

  /**
   * _sanitizeAttributes
   *
   * @protect attributes
   * @protect nodeName
   * @protect removeAttribute
   * @protect setAttribute
   *
   * @param currentNode to sanitize
   */
  const _sanitizeAttributes = function (currentNode: Element): void {
    /* Execute a hook if present */
    _executeHooks(hooks.beforeSanitizeAttributes, currentNode, null);

    const { attributes } = currentNode;

    /* Check if we have attributes; if not we might have a text node */
    if (!attributes || _isClobbered(currentNode)) {
      return;
    }

    const hookEvent = {
      attrName: '',
      attrValue: '',
      keepAttr: true,
      allowedAttributes: ALLOWED_ATTR,
      forceKeepAttr: undefined,
    };
    let l = attributes.length;

    /* Go backwards over all attributes; safely remove bad ones */
    while (l--) {
      const attr = attributes[l];
      const { name, namespaceURI, value: attrValue } = attr;
      const lcName = transformCaseFunc(name);

      const initValue = attrValue;
      let value = name === 'value' ? initValue : stringTrim(initValue);

      /* Execute a hook if present */
      hookEvent.attrName = lcName;
      hookEvent.attrValue = value;
      hookEvent.keepAttr = true;
      hookEvent.forceKeepAttr = undefined; // Allows developers to see this is a property they can set
      _executeHooks(hooks.uponSanitizeAttribute, currentNode, hookEvent);
      value = hookEvent.attrValue;

      /* Full DOM Clobbering protection via namespace isolation,
       * Prefix id and name attributes with `user-content-`
       */
      if (
        SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS &&
        (lcName === 'id' || lcName === 'name') &&
        stringIndexOf(value, SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS_PREFIX) !== 0
      ) {
        // Remove the attribute with this value
        _removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
        // Prefix the value and later re-create the attribute with the sanitized value
        value = SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS_PREFIX + value;
      }
      // Else: already prefixed, leave the attribute alone — the prefix is
      // itself the clobbering protection, and re-applying it is incorrect.

      /* Work around a security issue with comments inside attributes */
      if (
        SAFE_FOR_XML &&
        regExpTest(
          /((--!?|])>)|<\/(style|script|title|xmp|textarea|noscript|iframe|noembed|noframes)/i,
          value
        )
      ) {
        _removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
        continue;
      }

      /* Make sure we cannot easily use animated hrefs, even if animations are allowed */
      if (lcName === 'attributename' && stringMatch(value, 'href')) {
        _removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
        continue;
      }

      /* Did the hooks approve of the attribute? */
      if (hookEvent.forceKeepAttr) {
        continue;
      }

      /* Did the hooks approve of the attribute? */
      if (!hookEvent.keepAttr) {
        _removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
        continue;
      }

      /* Work around a security issue in jQuery 3.0 */
      if (!ALLOW_SELF_CLOSE_IN_ATTR && regExpTest(/\/>/i, value)) {
        _removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
        continue;
      }

      /* Sanitize attribute content to be template-safe */
      if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
        arrayForEach([MUSTACHE_EXPR, ERB_EXPR, TMPLIT_EXPR], (expr: RegExp) => {
          value = stringReplace(value, expr, ' ');
        });
      }

      /* Is `value` valid for this attribute? */
      const lcTag = transformCaseFunc(currentNode.nodeName);
      if (!_isValidAttribute(lcTag, lcName, value)) {
        _removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
        continue;
      }

      /* Handle attributes that require Trusted Types */
      if (
        trustedTypesPolicy &&
        typeof trustedTypes === 'object' &&
        typeof trustedTypes.getAttributeType === 'function'
      ) {
        if (namespaceURI) {
          /* Namespaces are not yet supported, see https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=1305293 */
        } else {
          switch (trustedTypes.getAttributeType(lcTag, lcName)) {
            case 'TrustedHTML': {
              value = _createTrustedHTML(value);
              break;
            }

            case 'TrustedScriptURL': {
              value = _createTrustedScriptURL(value);
              break;
            }

            default: {
              break;
            }
          }
        }
      }

      /* Handle invalid data-* attribute set by try-catching it */
      if (value !== initValue) {
        try {
          if (namespaceURI) {
            currentNode.setAttributeNS(namespaceURI, name, value);
          } else {
            /* Fallback to setAttribute() for browser-unrecognized namespaces e.g. "x-schema". */
            currentNode.setAttribute(name, value);
          }

          if (_isClobbered(currentNode)) {
            _forceRemove(currentNode);
          } else {
            arrayPop(DOMPurify.removed);
          }
        } catch (_) {
          _removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
        }
      }
    }

    /* Execute a hook if present */
    _executeHooks(hooks.afterSanitizeAttributes, currentNode, null);
  };

  /**
   * _sanitizeShadowDOM
   *
   * @param fragment to iterate over recursively
   */
  const _sanitizeShadowDOM = function (fragment: DocumentFragment): void {
    let shadowNode = null;
    const shadowIterator = _createNodeIterator(fragment);

    /* Execute a hook if present */
    _executeHooks(hooks.beforeSanitizeShadowDOM, fragment, null);

    while ((shadowNode = shadowIterator.nextNode())) {
      /* Execute a hook if present */
      _executeHooks(hooks.uponSanitizeShadowNode, shadowNode, null);

      /* Sanitize tags and elements */
      _sanitizeElements(shadowNode);

      /* Check attributes next */
      _sanitizeAttributes(shadowNode);

      /* Deep shadow DOM detected.
         Realm-safe check (GHSA-hpcv-96wg-7vj8): use nodeType against the
         DOCUMENT_FRAGMENT_NODE constant rather than instanceof, so we
         recurse into <template>.content from foreign realms too. */
      if (_isDocumentFragment(shadowNode.content)) {
        _sanitizeShadowDOM(shadowNode.content);
      }

      /* An element iterated here may itself host an attached
         shadow root. The default NodeIterator does not enter shadow
         trees, so a shadow root nested inside template.content was
         previously reached by no walk at all (the pre-pass at
         _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots descends via childNodes, which
         doesn't enter template.content; the template-content recursion
         above iterates the content but never inspected shadowRoot).
         Walk it explicitly. The nodeType guard avoids reading
         shadowRoot off text / comment / CDATA / PI nodes that the
         iterator also surfaces. */
      const shadowNodeType = getNodeType
        ? getNodeType(shadowNode)
        : shadowNode.nodeType;
      if (shadowNodeType === NODE_TYPE.element) {
        const innerSr = getShadowRoot
          ? getShadowRoot(shadowNode)
          : (shadowNode as Element).shadowRoot;
        if (_isDocumentFragment(innerSr)) {
          _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots(innerSr);
          _sanitizeShadowDOM(innerSr);
        }
      }
    }

    /* Execute a hook if present */
    _executeHooks(hooks.afterSanitizeShadowDOM, fragment, null);
  };

  /**
   * _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots
   *
   * Walks `root` and feeds every attached shadow root we encounter into
   * the existing _sanitizeShadowDOM pipeline. The default node iterator
   * does not descend into shadow trees, so nodes inside an attached
   * shadow root would otherwise be skipped entirely.
   *
   * Two real input paths put attached shadow roots in front of us:
   *   1. IN_PLACE on a DOM node that already has shadow roots attached.
   *   2. DOM-node input where importNode(dirty, true) deep-clones the
   *      shadow root because it was created with `clonable: true`.
   *
   * This pass runs once, up front, so the main iteration loop (and the
   * existing _sanitizeShadowDOM template-content recursion) stay
   * untouched — string-input paths are not affected.
   *
   * @param root the subtree root to walk for attached shadow roots
   */
  const _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots = function (root: Node): void {
    /* Iterative (explicit stack) rather than per-child recursion. DOM APIs
       impose no depth cap, so an attacker-shaped tree (JSON/CRDT/editor data
       built straight into the DOM — the IN_PLACE surface) deeper than the JS
       call-stack budget would otherwise overflow native recursion here and
       throw at the IN_PLACE entry pre-pass, before a single node is
       sanitized, leaving the caller's live tree untouched (fail-open). See
       campaign-3 F4. A heap stack keeps depth off the call stack.

       Each work item is either a node to descend into, or a deferred
       `_sanitizeShadowDOM` for an already-walked shadow root. The deferred
       form preserves the original post-order discipline: a shadow root's
       nested shadow roots are discovered before the outer shadow is
       sanitized (which may remove hosts). Pushes are in reverse of the
       desired processing order (LIFO): template content, then children, then
       the shadow-sanitize, then the shadow walk — so the order matches the
       previous recursion exactly. */
    const stack: Array<{ node: Node | null; shadow: DocumentFragment | null }> =
      [{ node: root, shadow: null }];

    while (stack.length > 0) {
      const item = stack.pop();

      /* Deferred shadow-DOM sanitisation: runs after its subtree was walked. */
      if (item.shadow) {
        _sanitizeShadowDOM(item.shadow);
        continue;
      }

      const node = item.node;
      const nodeType = getNodeType ? getNodeType(node) : (node as any).nodeType;
      const isElement = nodeType === NODE_TYPE.element;

      /* (pushed last → processed first) Children, snapshotted in reverse so
         the first child is processed first. Snapshotting matters because a
         hook may detach siblings mid-walk. */
      const childNodes = getChildNodes
        ? getChildNodes(node)
        : (node as Element).childNodes;
      if (childNodes) {
        for (let i = childNodes.length - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
          stack.push({ node: childNodes[i], shadow: null });
        }
      }

      /* (pushed before children → processed after them, matching the old
         "template content last" order) When the node is a <template>,
         descend into its content. */
      if (isElement) {
        const rootName = getNodeName ? getNodeName(node) : null;
        if (
          typeof rootName === 'string' &&
          transformCaseFunc(rootName) === 'template'
        ) {
          const content = (node as HTMLTemplateElement).content;
          if (_isDocumentFragment(content)) {
            stack.push({ node: content, shadow: null });
          }
        }
      }

      /* Shadow root (processed first): walk its subtree, then sanitise it.
         Realm-safe check (GHSA-hpcv-96wg-7vj8): nodeType-based detection
         rather than `instanceof DocumentFragment`, which is realm-bound and
         silently skipped foreign-realm shadow roots (e.g.
         iframe.contentDocument attachShadow). */
      if (isElement) {
        const sr = getShadowRoot
          ? getShadowRoot(node)
          : (node as Element).shadowRoot;
        if (_isDocumentFragment(sr)) {
          /* Push the deferred sanitise first so it pops after the shadow
             walk we push next, i.e. nested shadow roots are discovered
             before this one is sanitised. */
          stack.push({ node: null, shadow: sr }, { node: sr, shadow: null });
        }
      }
    }
  };

  // eslint-disable-next-line complexity
  DOMPurify.sanitize = function (dirty, cfg = {}) {
    let body = null;
    let importedNode = null;
    let currentNode = null;
    let returnNode = null;
    /* Make sure we have a string to sanitize.
      DO NOT return early, as this will return the wrong type if
      the user has requested a DOM object rather than a string */
    IS_EMPTY_INPUT = !dirty;
    if (IS_EMPTY_INPUT) {
      dirty = '<!-->';
    }

    /* Stringify, in case dirty is an object */
    if (typeof dirty !== 'string' && !_isNode(dirty)) {
      dirty = stringifyValue(dirty);

      if (typeof dirty !== 'string') {
        throw typeErrorCreate('dirty is not a string, aborting');
      }
    }

    /* Return dirty HTML if DOMPurify cannot run */
    if (!DOMPurify.isSupported) {
      return dirty;
    }

    /* Assign config vars */
    if (!SET_CONFIG) {
      _parseConfig(cfg);
    }

    /* Clean up removed elements */
    DOMPurify.removed = [];

    /* Resolve IN_PLACE for this call without mutating persistent config.
       Writing the IN_PLACE closure variable here leaks under setConfig(),
       where _parseConfig is skipped on later calls: a single string call would
       disable in-place mode for every subsequent node call, returning a
       sanitized copy while leaving the caller's node — which in-place callers
       keep using and whose return value they ignore — unsanitized. REPORT-2. */
    const inPlace = IN_PLACE && typeof dirty !== 'string' && _isNode(dirty);

    if (inPlace) {
      /* Do some early pre-sanitization to avoid unsafe root nodes.
         Read nodeName through the cached prototype getter — a clobbering
         child named "nodeName" on the form root would otherwise shadow
         the property and let this check skip the root-allowlist
         validation entirely. */
      const nn = getNodeName
        ? getNodeName(dirty as Node)
        : (dirty as Node).nodeName;
      if (typeof nn === 'string') {
        const tagName = transformCaseFunc(nn);
        if (!ALLOWED_TAGS[tagName] || FORBID_TAGS[tagName]) {
          throw typeErrorCreate(
            'root node is forbidden and cannot be sanitized in-place'
          );
        }
      }

      /* Pre-flight the root through _isClobbered. The iterator-driven
         removal path can not detach a parent-less root: _forceRemove
         falls through to Element.prototype.remove(), which per spec
         is a no-op on a node with no parent. A clobbered root would
         then survive the main loop with its attributes uninspected,
         because _sanitizeAttributes early-returns on _isClobbered. The
         result would be an attacker-controlled form, complete with any
         event-handler attributes the caller passed in, handed back to
         the application unsanitized. Refuse to sanitize such a root
         the same way we refuse a forbidden tag. GHSA-r47g-fvhr-h676. */
      if (_isClobbered(dirty as Element)) {
        throw typeErrorCreate(
          'root node is clobbered and cannot be sanitized in-place'
        );
      }

      /* Sanitize attached shadow roots before the main iterator runs.
         The iterator does not descend into shadow trees. Same fail-closed
         barrier as the main walk (campaign-3 F2): a custom-element reaction
         inside a shadow root could abort this pre-pass before the walk runs,
         which would otherwise leave the entire live tree unsanitized. */
      try {
        _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots(dirty as Node);
      } catch (error) {
        _neutralizeRoot(dirty as Node);

        throw error;
      }
    } else if (_isNode(dirty)) {
      /* If dirty is a DOM element, append to an empty document to avoid
         elements being stripped by the parser */
      body = _initDocument('<!---->');
      importedNode = body.ownerDocument.importNode(dirty, true);
      if (
        importedNode.nodeType === NODE_TYPE.element &&
        importedNode.nodeName === 'BODY'
      ) {
        /* Node is already a body, use as is */
        body = importedNode;
      } else if (importedNode.nodeName === 'HTML') {
        body = importedNode;
      } else {
        // eslint-disable-next-line unicorn/prefer-dom-node-append
        body.appendChild(importedNode);
      }

      /* Clonable shadow roots are deep-cloned by importNode(); sanitize
         them before the main iterator runs, since the iterator does not
         descend into shadow trees. The walk routes every read through a
         cached prototype getter so clobbering descendants on a form root
         cannot hide a shadow host from this pass. */
      _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots(importedNode);
    } else {
      /* Exit directly if we have nothing to do */
      if (
        !RETURN_DOM &&
        !SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES &&
        !WHOLE_DOCUMENT &&
        // eslint-disable-next-line unicorn/prefer-includes
        dirty.indexOf('<') === -1
      ) {
        return trustedTypesPolicy && RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE
          ? _createTrustedHTML(dirty)
          : dirty;
      }

      /* Initialize the document to work on */
      body = _initDocument(dirty);

      /* Check we have a DOM node from the data */
      if (!body) {
        return RETURN_DOM ? null : RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE ? emptyHTML : '';
      }
    }

    /* Remove first element node (ours) if FORCE_BODY is set */
    if (body && FORCE_BODY) {
      _forceRemove(body.firstChild);
    }

    /* Get node iterator */
    const nodeIterator = _createNodeIterator(inPlace ? dirty : body);

    /* Now start iterating over the created document.
       The walk runs inside an exception barrier (campaign-3 F2): a re-entrant
       engine/custom-element mutation can detach a node mid-walk so
       `_forceRemove`'s parentless guard throws, aborting the loop. Without the
       barrier the caller's in-place tree would be left half-sanitized with the
       unvisited tail still armed. On any throw we fail closed — strip the
       in-place root bare — then rethrow so the existing throw contract is
       preserved. (String/DOM-copy paths never return the partial body, so the
       propagating throw is already fail-closed there.) */
    try {
      while ((currentNode = nodeIterator.nextNode())) {
        /* Sanitize tags and elements */
        _sanitizeElements(currentNode);

        /* Check attributes next */
        _sanitizeAttributes(currentNode);

        /* Shadow DOM detected, sanitize it.
           Realm-safe check (GHSA-hpcv-96wg-7vj8): nodeType-based detection
           instead of instanceof, so foreign-realm <template>.content is
           walked correctly. */
        if (_isDocumentFragment(currentNode.content)) {
          _sanitizeShadowDOM(currentNode.content);
        }
      }
    } catch (error) {
      if (inPlace) {
        _neutralizeRoot(dirty as Node);
      }

      throw error;
    }

    /* If we sanitized `dirty` in-place, return it. */
    if (inPlace) {
      /* Fail-closed completion of the audit-5 F1 fix: every node removed from
         the caller's live tree is detached but may still hold a queued
         resource-event handler that fires in page scope after we return. The
         move-hoist covers only disallowed-tag KEEP_CONTENT removals; strip the
         non-allow-listed attributes off every other removed subtree (clobber,
         mXSS, namespace, comments, KEEP_CONTENT:false, …) so those handlers are
         cancelled before any event can fire. Runs synchronously, pre-return. */
      arrayForEach(DOMPurify.removed, (entry) => {
        if (entry.element) {
          _neutralizeSubtree(entry.element as Node);
        }
      });

      if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
        _scrubTemplateExpressions(dirty as Element);
      }

      return dirty;
    }

    /* Return sanitized string or DOM */
    if (RETURN_DOM) {
      if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
        _scrubTemplateExpressions(body);
      }

      if (RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT) {
        returnNode = createDocumentFragment.call(body.ownerDocument);

        while (body.firstChild) {
          // eslint-disable-next-line unicorn/prefer-dom-node-append
          returnNode.appendChild(body.firstChild);
        }
      } else {
        returnNode = body;
      }

      if (ALLOWED_ATTR.shadowroot || ALLOWED_ATTR.shadowrootmode) {
        /*
          AdoptNode() is not used because internal state is not reset
          (e.g. the past names map of a HTMLFormElement), this is safe
          in theory but we would rather not risk another attack vector.
          The state that is cloned by importNode() is explicitly defined
          by the specs.
        */
        returnNode = importNode.call(originalDocument, returnNode, true);
      }

      return returnNode;
    }

    let serializedHTML = WHOLE_DOCUMENT ? body.outerHTML : body.innerHTML;

    /* Serialize doctype if allowed */
    if (
      WHOLE_DOCUMENT &&
      ALLOWED_TAGS['!doctype'] &&
      body.ownerDocument &&
      body.ownerDocument.doctype &&
      body.ownerDocument.doctype.name &&
      regExpTest(EXPRESSIONS.DOCTYPE_NAME, body.ownerDocument.doctype.name)
    ) {
      serializedHTML =
        '<!DOCTYPE ' + body.ownerDocument.doctype.name + '>\n' + serializedHTML;
    }

    /* Sanitize final string template-safe */
    if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
      arrayForEach([MUSTACHE_EXPR, ERB_EXPR, TMPLIT_EXPR], (expr: RegExp) => {
        serializedHTML = stringReplace(serializedHTML, expr, ' ');
      });
    }

    return trustedTypesPolicy && RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE
      ? _createTrustedHTML(serializedHTML)
      : serializedHTML;
  };

  DOMPurify.setConfig = function (cfg = {}) {
    _parseConfig(cfg);
    SET_CONFIG = true;
  };

  DOMPurify.clearConfig = function () {
    CONFIG = null;
    SET_CONFIG = false;

    // Drop any caller-supplied Trusted Types policy so it cannot poison later
    // `RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE` output. The internal default policy (cached, and
    // never recreated — Trusted Types throws on duplicate names) is restored by
    // the next `_parseConfig`. See GHSA-vxr8-fq34-vvx9.
    trustedTypesPolicy = defaultTrustedTypesPolicy;
    emptyHTML = '';
  };

  DOMPurify.isValidAttribute = function (tag, attr, value) {
    /* Initialize shared config vars if necessary. */
    if (!CONFIG) {
      _parseConfig({});
    }

    const lcTag = transformCaseFunc(tag);
    const lcName = transformCaseFunc(attr);
    return _isValidAttribute(lcTag, lcName, value);
  };

  DOMPurify.addHook = function (
    entryPoint: keyof HooksMap,
    hookFunction: HookFunction
  ) {
    if (typeof hookFunction !== 'function') {
      return;
    }

    arrayPush(hooks[entryPoint], hookFunction);
  };

  DOMPurify.removeHook = function (
    entryPoint: keyof HooksMap,
    hookFunction: HookFunction
  ) {
    if (hookFunction !== undefined) {
      const index = arrayLastIndexOf(hooks[entryPoint], hookFunction);

      return index === -1
        ? undefined
        : arraySplice(hooks[entryPoint], index, 1)[0];
    }

    return arrayPop(hooks[entryPoint]);
  };

  DOMPurify.removeHooks = function (entryPoint: keyof HooksMap) {
    hooks[entryPoint] = [];
  };

  DOMPurify.removeAllHooks = function () {
    hooks = _createHooksMap();
  };

  return DOMPurify;
}

export default createDOMPurify();

export interface DOMPurify {
  /**
   * Creates a DOMPurify instance using the given window-like object. Defaults to `window`.
   */
  (root?: WindowLike): DOMPurify;

  /**
   * Version label, exposed for easier checks
   * if DOMPurify is up to date or not
   */
  version: string;

  /**
   * Array of elements that DOMPurify removed during sanitation.
   * Empty if nothing was removed.
   */
  removed: Array<RemovedElement | RemovedAttribute>;

  /**
   * Expose whether this browser supports running the full DOMPurify.
   */
  isSupported: boolean;

  /**
   * Set the configuration once.
   *
   * @param cfg configuration object
   */
  setConfig(cfg?: Config): void;

  /**
   * Removes the configuration.
   */
  clearConfig(): void;

  /**
   * Provides core sanitation functionality.
   *
   * @param dirty string or DOM node
   * @param cfg object
   * @returns Sanitized TrustedHTML.
   */
  sanitize(
    dirty: string | Node,
    cfg: Config & { RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE: true }
  ): TrustedHTML;

  /**
   * Provides core sanitation functionality.
   *
   * @param dirty DOM node
   * @param cfg object
   * @returns Sanitized DOM node.
   */
  sanitize(dirty: Node, cfg: Config & { IN_PLACE: true }): Node;

  /**
   * Provides core sanitation functionality.
   *
   * @param dirty string or DOM node
   * @param cfg object
   * @returns Sanitized DOM node.
   */
  sanitize(dirty: string | Node, cfg: Config & { RETURN_DOM: true }): Node;

  /**
   * Provides core sanitation functionality.
   *
   * @param dirty string or DOM node
   * @param cfg object
   * @returns Sanitized document fragment.
   */
  sanitize(
    dirty: string | Node,
    cfg: Config & { RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT: true }
  ): DocumentFragment;

  /**
   * Provides core sanitation functionality.
   *
   * @param dirty string or DOM node
   * @param cfg object
   * @returns Sanitized string.
   */
  sanitize(dirty: string | Node, cfg?: Config): string;

  /**
   * Checks if an attribute value is valid.
   * Uses last set config, if any. Otherwise, uses config defaults.
   *
   * @param tag Tag name of containing element.
   * @param attr Attribute name.
   * @param value Attribute value.
   * @returns Returns true if `value` is valid. Otherwise, returns false.
   */
  isValidAttribute(tag: string, attr: string, value: string): boolean;

  /**
   * Adds a DOMPurify hook.
   *
   * @param entryPoint entry point for the hook to add
   * @param hookFunction function to execute
   */
  addHook(entryPoint: BasicHookName, hookFunction: NodeHook): void;

  /**
   * Adds a DOMPurify hook.
   *
   * @param entryPoint entry point for the hook to add
   * @param hookFunction function to execute
   */
  addHook(entryPoint: ElementHookName, hookFunction: ElementHook): void;

  /**
   * Adds a DOMPurify hook.
   *
   * @param entryPoint entry point for the hook to add
   * @param hookFunction function to execute
   */
  addHook(
    entryPoint: DocumentFragmentHookName,
    hookFunction: DocumentFragmentHook
  ): void;

  /**
   * Adds a DOMPurify hook.
   *
   * @param entryPoint entry point for the hook to add
   * @param hookFunction function to execute
   */
  addHook(
    entryPoint: 'uponSanitizeElement',
    hookFunction: UponSanitizeElementHook
  ): void;

  /**
   * Adds a DOMPurify hook.
   *
   * @param entryPoint entry point for the hook to add
   * @param hookFunction function to execute
   */
  addHook(
    entryPoint: 'uponSanitizeAttribute',
    hookFunction: UponSanitizeAttributeHook
  ): void;

  /**
   * Remove a DOMPurify hook at a given entryPoint
   * (pops it from the stack of hooks if hook not specified)
   *
   * @param entryPoint entry point for the hook to remove
   * @param hookFunction optional specific hook to remove
   * @returns removed hook
   */
  removeHook(
    entryPoint: BasicHookName,
    hookFunction?: NodeHook
  ): NodeHook | undefined;

  /**
   * Remove a DOMPurify hook at a given entryPoint
   * (pops it from the stack of hooks if hook not specified)
   *
   * @param entryPoint entry point for the hook to remove
   * @param hookFunction optional specific hook to remove
   * @returns removed hook
   */
  removeHook(
    entryPoint: ElementHookName,
    hookFunction?: ElementHook
  ): ElementHook | undefined;

  /**
   * Remove a DOMPurify hook at a given entryPoint
   * (pops it from the stack of hooks if hook not specified)
   *
   * @param entryPoint entry point for the hook to remove
   * @param hookFunction optional specific hook to remove
   * @returns removed hook
   */
  removeHook(
    entryPoint: DocumentFragmentHookName,
    hookFunction?: DocumentFragmentHook
  ): DocumentFragmentHook | undefined;

  /**
   * Remove a DOMPurify hook at a given entryPoint
   * (pops it from the stack of hooks if hook not specified)
   *
   * @param entryPoint entry point for the hook to remove
   * @param hookFunction optional specific hook to remove
   * @returns removed hook
   */
  removeHook(
    entryPoint: 'uponSanitizeElement',
    hookFunction?: UponSanitizeElementHook
  ): UponSanitizeElementHook | undefined;

  /**
   * Remove a DOMPurify hook at a given entryPoint
   * (pops it from the stack of hooks if hook not specified)
   *
   * @param entryPoint entry point for the hook to remove
   * @param hookFunction optional specific hook to remove
   * @returns removed hook
   */
  removeHook(
    entryPoint: 'uponSanitizeAttribute',
    hookFunction?: UponSanitizeAttributeHook
  ): UponSanitizeAttributeHook | undefined;

  /**
   * Removes all DOMPurify hooks at a given entryPoint
   *
   * @param entryPoint entry point for the hooks to remove
   */
  removeHooks(entryPoint: HookName): void;

  /**
   * Removes all DOMPurify hooks.
   */
  removeAllHooks(): void;
}

/**
 * An element removed by DOMPurify.
 */
export interface RemovedElement {
  /**
   * The element that was removed.
   */
  element: Node;
}

/**
 * An element removed by DOMPurify.
 */
export interface RemovedAttribute {
  /**
   * The attribute that was removed.
   */
  attribute: Attr | null;

  /**
   * The element that the attribute was removed.
   */
  from: Node;
}

type BasicHookName =
  | 'beforeSanitizeElements'
  | 'afterSanitizeElements'
  | 'uponSanitizeShadowNode';
type ElementHookName = 'beforeSanitizeAttributes' | 'afterSanitizeAttributes';
type DocumentFragmentHookName =
  | 'beforeSanitizeShadowDOM'
  | 'afterSanitizeShadowDOM';
type UponSanitizeElementHookName = 'uponSanitizeElement';
type UponSanitizeAttributeHookName = 'uponSanitizeAttribute';

interface HooksMap {
  beforeSanitizeElements: NodeHook[];
  afterSanitizeElements: NodeHook[];
  beforeSanitizeShadowDOM: DocumentFragmentHook[];
  uponSanitizeShadowNode: NodeHook[];
  afterSanitizeShadowDOM: DocumentFragmentHook[];
  beforeSanitizeAttributes: ElementHook[];
  afterSanitizeAttributes: ElementHook[];
  uponSanitizeElement: UponSanitizeElementHook[];
  uponSanitizeAttribute: UponSanitizeAttributeHook[];
}

type ArrayElement<T> = T extends Array<infer U> ? U : never;

type HookFunction = ArrayElement<HooksMap[keyof HooksMap]>;

export type HookName =
  | BasicHookName
  | ElementHookName
  | DocumentFragmentHookName
  | UponSanitizeElementHookName
  | UponSanitizeAttributeHookName;

export type NodeHook = (
  this: DOMPurify,
  currentNode: Node,
  hookEvent: null,
  config: Config
) => void;

export type ElementHook = (
  this: DOMPurify,
  currentNode: Element,
  hookEvent: null,
  config: Config
) => void;

export type DocumentFragmentHook = (
  this: DOMPurify,
  currentNode: DocumentFragment,
  hookEvent: null,
  config: Config
) => void;

export type UponSanitizeElementHook = (
  this: DOMPurify,
  currentNode: Node,
  hookEvent: UponSanitizeElementHookEvent,
  config: Config
) => void;

export type UponSanitizeAttributeHook = (
  this: DOMPurify,
  currentNode: Element,
  hookEvent: UponSanitizeAttributeHookEvent,
  config: Config
) => void;

export interface UponSanitizeElementHookEvent {
  tagName: string;
  allowedTags: Record<string, boolean>;
}

export interface UponSanitizeAttributeHookEvent {
  attrName: string;
  attrValue: string;
  keepAttr: boolean;
  allowedAttributes: Record<string, boolean>;
  forceKeepAttr: boolean | undefined;
}

/**
 * A `Window`-like object containing the properties and types that DOMPurify requires.
 */
export type WindowLike = Pick<
  typeof globalThis,
  | 'DocumentFragment'
  | 'HTMLTemplateElement'
  | 'Node'
  | 'Element'
  | 'NodeFilter'
  | 'NamedNodeMap'
  | 'HTMLFormElement'
  | 'DOMParser'
> & {
  document?: Document;
  MozNamedAttrMap?: typeof window.NamedNodeMap;
} & Pick<TrustedTypesWindow, 'trustedTypes'>;